4. Air Crash Story

4.1 In the preceding chapter a brief reference has been made to the story of Bose's death at Taipei after an air crash and to the numerous other versions of what happened to him after the war on the eastern front had come to an end and the Japanese forces had surrendered. These stories will now be examined and the evidence bearing on them discussed.

4.2 The version which claims our foremost attention is naturally the story of his death, consequent upon an air crash on the Taihoku airfield on August 18, 1945. This story was the first, in point of time, to gain currency after its announcement on the radio from Tokyo on August 23, and to receive wide acceptance. Also it constitutes a positive assertion supported by a number of witnesses who do not appear to have any motive or reason for committing perjury and who, therefore, may be said to constitute independent testimony. The story briefly is as follows:

At the beginning of August 1945, it was abundantly clear that the Japanese could not win the war, and the Allies were determined to clinch the issue and inflict an immediate and total defeat on their foes. The dropping of two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki compelled the Japanese to surrender, and resign themselves to an ignominious defeat. A message was sent to Bose informing him of the proposed terms of surrender. Bose had to decide quickly what should be his future course of action. Should he surrender to the Allies alongwith the Japanese? Should he, as the head of an Independent State, distinct from the Japanese, offer to surrender separately and on separate terms? Should he continue to fight the Allies on the Indian front and go on striving to free India from British domination? Or, should he escape to a place of safety beyond the control of the Allies and make further plans for whatever seemed feasible? After discussing the matter with his colleagues and ministers of the Provisional Government of Free India and the Japanese military authorities, he chose the last alternative. He, accordingly, asked the Japanese to make arrangement for his escape to Russian territory because he believed that Indian aspirations evoked a sympathetic response from the Russians. Bose had already attempted to contact the Russians through the Japanese diplomatic channels, but the Japanese had not made a favourable response to his request. However, now, when the Russians had made a formal declaration of war against the Japanese, to send Bose to Russia would not cause them any embarrassment vis-a-vis the Allies. Also, the war having ended, the Japanese were not going to fight any more, and Bose had become a dispensable ally. They welcomed the opportunity to be relieved of what must, in the altered circumstances, have been looked upon as a liability. No cut and dried plan of conveying Bose out of the area under Allied control could be prepared, because the Americans had laid a strict embargo on all flights by the Japanese, and in the chaotic conditions prevailing after the defeat and humiliation suffered by the Japanese, it was impossible to prescribe an exact schedule of the Journey. Bose had, therefore, to hold himself in readiness to fly immediately whenever accomodation on a plane flying to or toward Russian territory became available.

4.5 An essential ingredient of this story is the reason which prompted Bose to undertake the journey which ended at Taihoku, in other words, the purpose and the ratio of this journey. We have seen that the endeavour to liberate India from British dominion had proved abortive. The Indian National Army had suffered a complete defeat in Burma, and the retreat from the battle front had soon taken the form of a rout. Bose withdrew to the comparative safety of Saramban to brood over the catastrophe and to try to devise some means of salvaging whatever could be salvaged. There, he received a message informing him of Japan's imminent capitulation and the terms on which the Japanese army had agreed to surrender to the Allied forces. Bose had to think quickly, and formulate plans for the immediate future of the IN A and his own course of action. His one obsession of fighting the British tyranny and freeing India had never left him, and now weighed upon him more heavily than before. There was also, in addition, the threat to his own personal safety, for he could scarcely hope for amnesty or leniency if he fell into the hands of Anglo-American military authorities. Several alternatives presented themselves before him. He could toe the line with the Japanese, and as helper, collaborator and the recipient of Japanese assistance, both moral and material, accept the same surrender terms and submit himself and the forces he had commanded to the demand of the victors. In doing this, he would impose upon himself the inferior status of a subsidiary ally of Japan, something he had strenuously resisted from the moment he assumed charge of the reconstituted INA, and bent his total energy to the war in Burma. He could not relish such ignominy. A voluntary surrender would not guarantee his life, for the British could try him as a traitor for waging war against them and pass sentence of death upon him. He could refuse to surrender and continue what he clearly saw was a losing fight by rallying his forces and opening another front. But such a venture, if undertaken immediately, was likely to end in disaster. He had not hesitated to face mortal danger on the battle-field, and to die in a venture which promised success, was for him an act of glory and supreme patriotism. But to undertake a suicidal adventure which would destroy him and the men in his charge would have been nothing short of folly. His undying patriotism and his undiminished confidence in the resources of his physical and mental powers dictated caution and a period of waiting. He had contemplated the possibility of obtaining Russian sympathy and aid in striving for the fulfilment of his dreams. But Russia had aligned itself with the Allies, and had now declared war against Japan. Any overtures he made to Russia could not be made without consultation with Japan for he was in duty bound to act in collaboration with his friend and helper. The rules of war also dictated such consultation, and most important of all, he would need Japanese assistance in communicating with the Russian authorities. There was yet a third alternative. He could abandon the fight for the time being and surrender to the Allies separately, in his own right as the Head of the Provisional Government of Free India. But for this, too, he must consult the Japanese authorities or, at any rate, notify them and be guided by their advice. Whatever course he adopted, it was imperative that he should discuss his plan with the Japanese headquarters or the Japanese political authorities. The commander of the Japanese forces in South-East Asia was Field Marshal Count Terauchi, who was at Dalat, not far from Saigon. Terauchi might have received advice from Tokyo about Bose's future conduct, or he might be able to obtain instructions from Tokyo. But if Terauchi was unable to help him, Bose might have to go to Tokyo in order to finalise his plan. In any event, it was essential that Bose take immediate steps to arrive at a decision after discussing the whole matter at Dalat or at Tokyo. He had yet made up his mind about what exactly he wanted to do or what was best in the circumstances. Even the two alternatives he was considering (after rejecting the easy but ignominous course of a subservient surrender along with the Japanese) were not quite clearly defined and his plans were vague and amorphous, as of necessity they had to be, in the chaotic conditions prevailing after the Japanese had capitulated.

In addition to these 8 persons, Habibur Rahman also accompanied Bose on his last journey starting from Bangkok.

4.7. It will be seen that all the 8 witnesses named above were natural witnesses. They had a reason for being with Bose at the end of the war and during the period of his last journey. Bose had been consulting most of them, particularly Hachia and Gen. Isoda among the Japanese, and the remaining 5 Indian witnesses because they were either on his personal staff or were members of his Cabinet. It is clear that all 5 of them were completely devoted to Bose and had the greatest admiration for his talents, his dedication to duty and his organising abilities. It may be said that they blindly submitted to his orders without question. At the same time, it must be remembered that a period of more than 25 years has elapsed between the events in which they participated and their narrative of these events before the Commission. Human memory is liable to become foggy and misty, after the lapse of so many years, and the recollection of old events is seen against the light of subsequent happenings and, to a great extent, is modified by wishful thinking. Nevertheless; the evidence of these witnesses clearly shows that Bose had made up his mind to find a means of proceeding to Russia, if he could obtain the consent and the assistance of the Japanese in this venture. He had, on a previous occasion, tried to approach the Russian authorities through the Japanese, but the Japanese had not proved very helpful for reasons which are easy to understand. For, although at that time Russia had not specifically declared war against the Japanese, Russia was aligned with the Allies against the Axis forces. Russia had fought Germany and beaten back the Nazi armies from its territory on the Western front. Bose had hoped that the Russians with their old anti-British history, would be willing to help him or, at any rate, give him asylum for some time. He, therefore, asked the Japanese to convey him to some place where he would finalise his plans to go Russia or to do whatever else appeared feasible. Hachia had stated that at Bangkok, Bose told hime that he would like to go to Japan, Gen. Isoda was present at this conversation. When questioned, Hachia said: "May be, his idea was to go to Manchuria, but he said he would like to go to Japan." He went on to say that Bose requested Gen. Isoda to make transport arrangements. He accompanied Bose's party from Bangkok to Saigon. Nigeshi's evidence is that he delivered a letter containing the terms of surender to Bose at Saramban and accompanied him to Singapore on August 15, 1945. The party consisting of the 8 witnesses named above, Col. Habibur Rahman and few others travelled from Bangkok to Saigon in two bomber planes. He was not able to say what Bose's plans were, but it was never said at any time that Bose was going directly to Russia or to Manchuria, from where he would make his way to Russia. He does, however, say that Bose intended to see Field Marshal Terauchi, and the interview was to be arranged by General Isoda. Therefore, this witness, too speaks of Bose's resolve to consult the Japanese authorities before he finalised his plan.

4.8. General Isoda, as has been stated already, was the chief of the Supreme Liaison Organisation, Hikari Kikan, and as such, was the liaison between the Japanese Government and the Provisional Government of Free India. He was at Bangkok when Bose arrived from Rangoon. He remained there during Bose's brief visit to Singapore, and accompanied him up to Saigon. At Saigon, Bose was informed that a plane was going to Tokyo, via Dairen, where General Shidei had been posted. Only one seat was available in this plane. It was necessary to obtain Terauchi's authority if Bose insisted on taking any member of his staff with him. Isoda, therefore, undertook to go to Dalat and obtain Terauchi's orders in the matter. Isoda could not meet Terauchi at Dalat, but a Staff Officer told him that Bose would be allowed to take only two members of his Cabinet along with him. On his returning to Saigon, Staff Officer Tada told him that only two persons in all would be allowed to board the plane. General Isoda speaks of Bose's plan to go to Russia. When questioned about the purpose of the flight, he said: "The purpose of his flight was to go to the Soviet Union, and with the aid of the Soviet Union, he was to continue his independent movement. That was the aim of the mission. After reaching Dairen, if time allowed he had intended to go to Tokyo to express his gratitude for the Japanese help and also to collect some supplies from Tokyo. I thought no such time would be available to him for going to Tokyo. The main purpose of Mr. Bose was to go to the Soviet Union and his desire to go to Tokyo was only secondary." This point was further emphasized by Isoda when he spoke of his intervention to secure more seats for Bose's party on the plane. The flight had been primarily arranged for General Shidei who had to reach Dairen immediately, before the American army authorities arrived in Saigon to enforce a categorical ban on all Japanese aircraft movement. Isoda argued with Bose asking him not to reject the offer of two seats and thus miss the opportunity of escaping from Saigon. "So, I suggested to Mr. Bose that he should accept that arrangement for going to Soviet Russia." When Bose was given an assurance that arrangements would be made to send the remaining members of his party, later, to join him, he agreed.

4.9. Iyer's evidence highlights the fact that Bose held long discussions about his future course of action with his Ministers at Saramban, Singapore and again at Saigon. Russia had loomed large on Bose's mental horizon as his avenue of escape, his refuge and his possible hope for the resumption of his labours to free India from British bondage. But the declaration of war by Russia was a fresh development which had to be taken into account, necessitating, as it did, a reconsideration of the provisional plan. A series of meetings was held at Singapore daily, from the evening of August 12 till the midnight of August 15. At first it was contemplated that Bose and his Ministers should stay on at Singapore and allow themselves "to be taken prisoners by the British, who were expected at any time." Mr. Saka arrived from Bangkok and the discussions then took a different turn. It was finally decided that they must all leave Singapore. "The final decision was to get out of Malaya and Singapore definitely, to some Russian territory certainly, to Russia itself if possible. Netaji described this decision in his own words as 'an adventure into the unknown'."

4.10 On the morning of August 16, the whole party flew from Singapore to Bangkok, where Bose and his Cabinet spent the night. On the morning of August 17, the party, augmented by some Japanese military personnel, left Bangkok in two bomber planes and flew to Saigon where they arrived before noon. At the Saigon airport, hurried consultations took place. As a result of these, General Isoda flew to Dalat to consult Field Marshal Terauchi. Bose and his party, in the meantime, drove into the town to await developments. Soon a messenger came and said that a plane was ready to take off; only one seat in it was available and Bose should reach the aerodrome immediately to avail of it. The messenger did not know the destination of the plane and Bose declined to leave till he was enlightened on this point. Iyer went on to say: "Half an hour later, General Isoda, Hachia and a senior Staff Officer arrived at the Bungalow and went into a conference with Netaji in one of the rooms. Col. Habibur Rahman was asked to join this conference. Some time later, Netaji and Col. Habibur came out, leaving the Japanese behind. Maj. Abid Hasan, Deb Nath Das and myself followed Netaji and Col. Habib into Netaji's room. Col. Gulzara Singh and Col. Pritam Singh were urgently summoned. Netaji said; Tell them not to bother about that dress. I have no time to lose. We have to take important decisions and that, too, without a moment's delay.' They joined us and the room was bolted from inside, and Netaji stood in the middle, and we stood around him. He looked at each one's eyes and said: 'Look here. There is a plane ready to take off in the next few minutes, and we have to decide something important right now. The Japanese say that there is only one seat to spare, and what we have got to decide in a few seconds is whether I should go even if I have to go alone.' All of us felt it was a terrible decision to take....we said: 'Sir, please for Heaven's sake, insist on the Japanese giving you one more seat and if you still cannot get it then you had better take the one seat, and go. Also please insist that the Japanese should provide us with transport as soon as possible to take wherever you might be going."

4.11 Iyer went on to say that they believed that the plane was bound for Manchuria, but Bose did not specifically mention the fact. The plane finally took off, carrying inter alia, Bose and Habibur Rahman. Two days later, Iyer was informed that a plane was leaving for Japan on the 20th, and one member of the party could be accomodated in it. Actually, all the remaining members were given seats in two planes and were flown to Hanoi from where they were to fly to Japan.

4.12 It appears from Iyer's evidence that, at Saigon, that Japanese made a change in Bose's programme not only with regard to the persons who were to go with him, reducing the number to one (Habibur Rahman), but also with regard to his ultimate destination.

4.13 This change of plan is specifically mentioned by Deb Nath Das, though his evidence is somewhat contradictory and muddled, either because his memory is deceiving him or because he was overcome by emotion as, at one stage of his deposition, he frankly confessed. His story is a little different in detail from the story given by the other witnesses, though the differences are inessential and do not amount to contradictions. He spoke of three alternate plans which had been discussed and prepared even before the end of the war. One plan was to take Bose by plane and drop him somewhere in India, where he could join the national movement and carry on the fight against the British along with the Indian freedom fighters. The second plan was that Bose should go to Yunan, the headquarters of Mao Tse Tung who would help him to carry on his campaign against the British. The third plan was that Bose should go to Russia directly. Das was somewhat confused about the procedural mechanics of these plans, but he stated that Bose had asked him to prepare the first plan, and when he met him at Bangkok, he was asked if the plan was ready. Das replied that it was. But the subsequent conduct neither of Das nor of Bose indicates that Bose ever gave any thought to the idea of going to India and internally taking part in the freedom struggle, because immediately after asking him if the plan was ready, he asked Das to collect his baggage and get ready to leave with him immediately. He gave no indication of where he would be going, nor did Das question him about the matter. To explain this changed conduct, Das said that Bose might have intended to fly to a place of safety, remain underground for sometime and then make an entry into India. But in view of the fact that Bose had been discussing the matter about his future plans repeatedly with his Ministers, it is scarcely possible that he should have observed such secrecy, amounting almost to deception, just before he was leaving Bangkok. About the Russian collaboration, Das said that several weeks before the end of the war, "when we negotiated with the Russian Embassy in Tokyo, with Jacob Malik through the (Japanese) Foreign Minister, Shigemetsu, we received a letter from the Japanese military authority in Tokyo, stating that it would not be feasible on the part of Japan to send Netaji to Russia". But the surrender of the Japanese introduced a fresh factor into the entire scheme of Indo-Japanese relations. The Japanese were no longer masters of themselves, nor could they handle any difficult or complex arrangements for carrying Bose and his party to a place of his choice. They agreed to let him surreptitiously escape to Dairen where Gen. Shidei was being sent and whence Bose could make his way to Russia. This would not involve the Japanese in any infringement of international law, nor cause them any diplomatic embarrassment. But according to Das, there was a sudden change of plan at Saigon. His statement before the Shah Nawaz Khan Committee was that Bose was to be taken to Tokyo. Bose felt very unhappy and said: "I don't know why they are changing the plan and specially they are telling me that I should go alone". When he appeared before me, however, Das said that Bose may have mentioned the matter of change of plans but he did not say that he was being taken to Tokyo. It is possible that this slight change is actuated by Das's desire to assert that the destination of Bose's plane was not Tokyo.

4.14 Pritam Singh stated that he dined with Bose on the evening of August 13 or 14, after the Japanese had surrendered. Bose consulted him about future strategy and if the INA too should surrender. "My suggestion", says Pritam Singh, "was that there were already thousands of men behind the bars. We would just add to their number. Then I suggested to him that we had better open a second front. Then he told me that contact had already been established with Russia, and we would try to move toward that direction". Pritam Singh, when questioned further on this point, stated that he overheard some talk about Bose going to Tokyo to discuss the matter of a separate surrender, but he was not sure who talked and what exactly was decided. His impression was that Bose and his party were going to Russia.