Recollections and reflections

Reminiscences, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai

I first came in contact with Subhas Bose in 1923 at Delhi when the Congress was divided into two groups over the question of what was known as 'Council Entry.'...Subhas Babu, as the favourite lieutenant of Deshabandhu, was playing a prominent part in the controversy. more>>

Section B.2.4 The Contribution of the British in the rise of the personality cult of M. Gandhi – intelligence input, publicity, repression of his opponents

We now comment on the role of British in the growth of M. Gandhi. British wanted to rule India as long as possible, and when they had to leave they wanted to transfer power to a friendly government. Wavell had a note prepared on the effect of the proposed transfer of power in India on "the Strategy, Economics and Prestige of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth", which concluded saying that "To sum up, it is vital to Britain that when she gives over political power in India, she may be able to hand over to a stable and friendly Government and contract with it a genuine defensive alliance....If this objective is achieved, the demission of political power may bring in advantage and not loss." pp.51-52, [64], p. 235, [72]. G. D. Birla reports a conversation with ex-British premier Winston Churchill in England after India became independent (he does not specify the date but it is before Vallabhbhai Patel's death – so the yearis likely 1949) which would be illuminating:"Then suddenly he [Churchill] asked me: 'Have you got a national anthem? Is it a good tune?. I said: 'not very good' ' Why don't you play with your own national anthem 'God save the king [the British national anthem] ? These small things help a lot. Canada has its own tune and yet side by side, they play ours too. This creates a friendly feeling. I explained to him the difficulty but added: 'That will depend on England. If you are friends, perhaps it may come. He remarked: 'I think it will come in course of time!' " p. 277, [57]. (Pertinent to note that G. D. Birla was then touring England to solicit capital for Indian industry, he was therefore negotiating with Churchill even on national fundamentals such as choice of national anthem. This provides insight into deeply ingrained merchantile mentality which conceives every symbol and every policy as an object of negotiation. Also, he did not hesitate confiding in Churchill that he did not like the tune of our National Anthem). In any event, British clearly desired a continuity of regime if and when they had to leave. Post 1857, it was clear to them that a freedom movement was inevitable in future. It was essential that they control the same towards the above objective. They realized that India needed a political organization for diffusing resentments through gentle protests, otherwise they would have to face yet another mass revolution like in 1857. Congress was created to functionas this safety valve.

A. O. Hume, a British civil servant, who retired as secretary to a department in Government of India after thirty three years of service, founded Congress in 1885, after consulting Lord Dufferin, then Viceroy of India and ex-Viceroys, Lords Dalhousie and Ripon p. 45, [69]. His biographer, Sir William Wedderburn, another retired British civilian, who presided over two sessions of Congress, describes him as the father of the Indian National Congress [70]. M. Gandhi acknowledged A. O. Hume's debt with the "greatest pleasure" pp. 360, [17], p. 103,[55]. Quoting the father of the Indian National Congress then, Congress was "devised" as a "safety-valve for the escape of great and growing forces, generated by our own action", and no more efficacious safety-valve than our Congress movement could possibly be devised. p. 77,[70]. One of the three "fundamental objects'' of the Congress, as per A. O. Hume was "the consolidation of the Union between England and India". He stated that "by carefully inoculating them [the great lower middle classes] with a mild and harmless form of political fever, we are adopting the only precautionary method against the otherwise inevitable ravages of a violent and epidemic burst of disorder." pp. 141-143 [71], p. 103,[55].

The character of the Congress was however fundamentally changing during 1890-1910 under the leadership of Lala Lajpat Raiin Punjab, Bal Gangadhar Tilak in Maharashtra and Bipin Chandra Pal in Bengal. The last two acted as an effective interface between the non-violent and political struggle by Congress and attempts of a revolution led by a militant faction outside. Tilak had mentored the Chapekar brothers, while Pal was a close collaborator of Aurobindo Ghosh. The trio had galvanized large parts ofIndia during the agitation objecting to the partition of Bengal in 1905 where Swadeshi, or boycott of all British goods(cloth, liquor etc) was employed in large scale. Note this was prior to M. Gandhi's return to India, and therefore Swadeshi was not his original contribution either. Aurobindo Ghoshe spoused the doctrine of passive resistance, through non-cooperation and boycott, in a series of articles, from 11-04-1907 to 23-04-1907, that is, long before M. Gandhi's return to India pp. 265-304, [8]. The British loyalist group in Congress led by G. Gokhale formed a "Servants of India" society whose objective was to " weanaway young Indians from militant nationalism'', funded by industrialists close to the British like R. J. Tata, Jehangir Petit, Thackersay and Lalubhai Samaldas p. 104, [55]. Tatas were particularly close to the British. In 1900, Hamilton urged J. N. Tata to undertake the building of a steel plant. The Secretary of State, promised him all government support and kept his promise. Viceroy Curzon prodded J. N. Tata to do his job more expeditiously. Government of India acquired a large site in Sakchi in Bihar for the steel plant. The railway board had placed its orders with TISCO even before the construction of the works started. An American firm of engineers (Julian Kennedy, Sahlin and Co) constructed the firm, and Wells, an American, became its first manager. Tata hydroelectric scheme also received encouragement and support from Lord George Hamilton and Lord Sydenham, the then Governor of Bombay, who laid the foundation of the Walwhan dam. Both Tata and Lord Willingdon, another governor of Bombay, described the project as imperial. The original idea was that most of the capital for the project should be raised in London. On 20th December, 1900, Hamilton wrote to Curzon: "I want to associate increased investment of British capital there with a simultaneous action on the part of the Government in developing industrial enterprise." But London money market was passing through one of its periodical phases of depression. So, Tata failed to obtain capital in England. But then Maharaja of Gwalior provided the entire working capital (only the princes who were loyal to the British were allowed to rule by 1900 – the Gwalior royal family belongs in this category) pp. 171-172,[72]. But, despite generous funding directed to G. Gokhale, the British-loyalist group in Congress was not winning against the nationalist group. It is in this backdrop that British discovered M. Gandhi, a talented disciple of G. Gokhale.

M. Gandhi had launched a civil disobedience movement in South Africa to protect the rights ofthe Indian middle class in South Africa, returned to India midway during the struggle after a minor concession was ceded, and before discriminations against Indians were ended there. British had every reason to hope that M. Gandhi would help Congress revert to its safety valve days by inoculating the middle classes with a mild and harmless form of political fever. Describing M. Gandhi prior to his return to India from South Africa, G.D. Birla writes: "He was indeed at this period an Anglophil. He had learned to like the English in their own countryand believed that their association with India would eventually lead to spreading democratic institutions in India. Hence his sympathies were never indoubt when he was in South Africa during the Boer war. " p.234, [57]. M. Gandhi indeed helped organize medical corps during the Boer waron the grounds that Indians who claimed writes as citizens of the British empire were obligated to help it [74].

Industrialists friendly to British had been observing M. Gandhi's moves closely in South Africa. On 10th January, 1910, Ratan Tata, the younger son of J. N. Tata who had received knighthood, had written to M. Gandhi "My warm appreciation of the noble struggle our countrymen are waging. Ineed hardly add that I shall watch the progress of the struggle with great interest." p. 174, Vol. 1, [98], p. 108, [55]. Ratan Tata, Sir Purshotmadas Thakurdas and Sir J. B Petit were respectively, president, vice-president and secretary of the South African Indian Relief Fund. Other business magnates, the Aga Khan, the Nizam of Hyderabad and other ruling princes were among his donors. In words of Gandhi in 1913, "the river of gold" flowed from India pp. 236, [110], and "Then money began to rain from India"pp. 273, [111], p. 157, p. 236, [12], p. 108, [55]. Again,only the ruling princes who were loyal to the British were allowed to survive until the beginning of the twentieth century. It is worthwhile to note that the British never clamped down on Gandhi's funding in South Africa, nor in India, but it did ruthlessly choke those of the revolutionaries.

The British Raj substantially helped Gandhi both directly and indirectly until he initiated a movement against them in 1942 during their life-death struggle in the Second World War. The British government directly helped M. Gandhi by sharing with him intelligence information. J. B. Kripalani, "one of Gandhi's men" had informed S. Bose's biographer, Leonard Gordon in an interview in New Delhi on September 10, 1976 that "Gandhi knew a lot more about Bose's connections to men of violence and to plans for potential violence than he ever let on in public" p. 387, [54]. It does not appear from the ten or of the above comment that it was S. Bose who had confided the above in Gandhi. So, was M. Gandhi keeping a tab on S. Bose? His source very likely was the British intelligence as would become evident from a letter by K. Munshi: "The Government of India knew my[Munshi's] relations with Gandhi & Sardar & often saw to it that confidential information reached Gandhiji through me. On one such occasion, I was shown certain secret service reports that Netaji had contacted the German Consul in Calcutta & had come to some arrangement with him,which would enable Germany to rely upon him in case there was a war. I conveyed this information to Gandhiji, who naturally felt surprised." pp.409, [95]. Citing a book written by Munshi, p. 53, [96], M. Gandhi's grandson has confirmed that there was a report that Subhas Bose had been " in contact with the German consul in Calcutta and was negotiating some arrangement.' The Raj's director of Central Intelligence had given the report to Munshi, Bombay's Law Minister, who forwarded it to the Mahatma. " p. 278, [62] This intelligence sharing had happened during 1938 when S. Bose was the President of Indian National Congress. Note that M. Gandhi did not raise a public hue and cry on why the British were snooping on the President of Congress, but he was content receiving this information. Also, note that the first citation shows that this was not a one time exchange – confidential information that British acquired often reached Gandhi and Vallabhbhai Patel through the intermediary K. Munshi. It has now emerged that this tradition continued post independence during J. Nehru's and subsequent regimes as S. Bose's family was snooped upon and the information thus acquired was shared with British intelligence [48, 49]. Thus, British government did ensure a continuity in regimes even after independence in more ways than one.

Many would condone the sharing of the intelligence in the above specific context given that it was on S. Bose meeting Nazis, yet, what is not generally understood is that the atrocities perpetrated by the British on India were comparable to that by Germany during different periods. In 1932, Bertrand Russell had written that British atrocities during 1930-1931 in India were comparable to those perpetrated by Germany during the first world war p. 347, [19]. The Nazi crimes were magnified greatly only post 1939, and neither M. Gandhi nor his coterie knew the same at least until mid-1940, which is at least a year before he received the above intelligence information. We establish the same citing their correspondences and speeches up to mid-1940. In March 1939(which is after M. Gandhi received the above intelligence), G. B. Pant who was very close to M. Gandhi and J. Nehru, spoke thus at the Tripuri session of Congress: "wherever nations had progressed they had done so under the leadership of one man. Germany had relied on Herr Hitler. Whether they agreed with Herr Hitler's methods or not, there was no gainsaying the fact that Germany had progressed under Herr Hitler. Italy had risen because of Signor Mussolini and it was Lenin that raised Russia." pp. 379-380, [54]. He subsequently reminded the delegates that "we have Gandhi...Then why should we not reap the full advantage of that factor." p. 380, [54]. Paraphrasing, G. B. Pant was seeing his revered leader M. Gandhi as the Hitler or Mussoliniof India. Incidentally, after meeting Mussolini in 1931, M. Gandhi wrote in a letter to Romain Rolland: "Mussolini is a riddle to me. Many of his reforms attract me. He seems to have done much for the peasant class. I admit an iron hand is there. But as violence is the basis of Western society, Mussolini's reforms deserve an impartial study. His care of the poor, his opposition to super-urbanization, his efforts to bring about coordination between capital and labor, seem to me to demand special attention... My own fundamental objection is that these reforms are compulsory. But it is the same in all democratic institutions. What strikes me is that behind Mussolini's implacability is a desire to serve his people. Even behind his emphatic speeches there is a nucleus of sincerity and of passionate love for his people. It seems to me that the majority of the Italian people love their on government of Mussolini."p. 297, [20]. On 16th May, 1940, Gandhi's secretary Mahadev Desai wrote to G. D Birla that "Hitler's stock with Bapu is going up." p. 255, [57]. On 6th June, 1940, Mahadev Desai wrote to G. D. Birla that "In his letter [to Viceroy Linlithgow] Bapu had written: 'This manslaughter must be stopped. You are losing; if you persist it will only result in greater bloodshed. Hitler is not a bad man. If you call it off today, he will follow suit. If you want to send me to Germany or anywhere else, I am at your disposal. You can also inform the cabinet about this'." p. 255, [57]. We see the same propensity in M. Gandhi to assume the leadership of the world before ensuring prosperity of his nation, that almost every premier in free India has shown. But, that aside, this establishes our corecontention. Next, considering a post facto analysis, the British perpetrated atrocities comparable to the Holocaust in India during the second world war. They killed approximately 3.5 million in the Bengal province alone during the Bengal famine of 1943 that they induced p. 504, [55], [97].

On the indirect front, the British enhanced Gandhi's stature among the general public by giving him a hero's welcome on his return to India from South Africa. As arranged by them, he was allowed to land at the Apollo Bunder in Bombay – an honor accorded to Royalty, by the Viceroys and India's most distinguished sons p. 246, Vol. 1, [98], p. 126, [55]. Viceroy Lord Hardinge conferred on him the Kaiser-i-Hind gold medal for his services in Africa p. 46, [100], p. 126, [55]. On his arrival in India, he was welcomed by whose who among the industrialists close to the British – Sir Dorab Tata, Sir J. B.Petit, Sir Vithaldas Thackersay, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola, Sir Jamshetji Jeejibhoy and others [2], p. 108, [55] – British would typically not knight any one who was not a loyalist (even Nobel laureate Rabindranath Thakur's family had a long history of loyalty and proximity to the British crown) . On 3rd June, 1940, Viceroy Linlithgow informed Gandhi that the Maharaja of Darbhanga, had given him a bust of Gandhi done by Clare Sheridanwhich "he proposed in the first instancebto have it exhibited in Bombay and thereafter to make it over to the Government of India with the suggestion that it should ultimately find a permanent home inthe national capital." p. 302, [109],p. 128, [55].

Indian and British presssignificantly publicised Gandhi's movements, except possibly the one in 1942. R. P. Dutt has written that "With the newsreel cameras of the world clicking away'' Gandhi's Dandi march received worldwide publicity, "through the press,the cinema and very other device.""Not only was the march not interfered with by the Raj but also the wide publicity of every detail was possible only with its active encouragement " pp. 301-302, [73], p. 127, [55].Government of free India backs R. P Dutt up p. [75]. S. Bose seconds the samepoint of view regarding the coverage of the salt march: "Fortunately for the Mahatma, he had a wonderfully good press within India andoutside. In India for days and days, every detail connected with the marchfound the widest publicity" p. 201, [4]. The discerning reader mayobserve curious similarities with sudden press interest accorded to AnnaHazare's fast in Jantar Mantar. In the pre-independence context, S. Bose hadobserved (not specific to Gandhi though) that British press colluded with itsgovernment in parachuting leaders who would further their interests "As a matter of fact, whenever the occasiondemands, leaders are created overnight by the British Government and, thanks tothe British Press their names are made known to the whole world " p.34, [4]. So, the mass support was in part manufactured or at theleast facilitated by interests inimical to India.

The British kidgloved M. Gandhi and his supporters throughout, and simultaneously ruthlessly persecuted and even physically eliminated the factions that opposed him. M. Gandhi and his faction (J. Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel) were usually incarcerated under comfortable conditions. During civil disobedience of 1930, the government lodged M. Gandhi in a jail where "Every provision will be made for his health and comfort during his detention''(cited in p. 304, [73], p.128, [55]). During Quit India movement he was imprisoned in the Aga Khan palace. British arranged a special train in 1946 for his travel to Madras, with a saloon which had a platform and a loud speaker using which he could address the people, p. 67, Vol. VII, [98]. But, revolutionaries were frequently executed or imprisoned in harshest of the British jails, eg Cellular in Andaman(Barin Ghosh, Sachindranath Sanyal, Veer Savarkar) where they often lost sanity (Ullas Kar) or committed suicide as a result of the persecutions. In a surprise attack, during October 1931, warders open fired ondetenus in Hijli in Bengal and assaulted them with the butt end of their rifles, killing 2, and seriously injuring 20 p. 260, [4]. Political leaders who opposed M. Gandhi were often imprisoned at times, without trial, in facilities which would be inhuman enough to permanently damage their health. Both S. Bose and B. Tilak were incarcerated at Mandalay jail – they were both incapacitated as a result. In fact, S. Bose had to recuperate for extended durations after another prison term too. British police lathi charged on Bose both inside and outside jail p. 205, [4], p. 240, [54]. K. P. Chattopadhyay, education officer of the Calcutta Corporation in which S. Bose was the Mayor in 1931 has written about one such occasion on which S. Bose was leading a procession from the Corporation to the nearby Maidan(on January26, 1931): "As we crossed Chowringhee, a body of mounted policemen charged into us scattering the people in our rear and isolating the Mayor and a few of us from the main body of the processionists. The mounted men then rode at us, especially the Mayor, hitting us with the short lathis in their hand. The Mayor was attacked on both sides, and I noted him protecting his head with his up-raised right arm, as best as he could. I shouted out to his assailants: 'You have no right to beat Subhas Chandra Bose. You can arrest him, but you have no right to beat him.' I then tried to protect the Mayor's head by holding the pole of the banner in my hand over him...On this one of these men rode at me and struck twice atmy unprotected head......None of the men who were beating the Mayor and myself were Indians." Note that the baton attack was a targeted one, directed at S. Bose, and specifically his head. S. Bose was arrested and taken to Lal Bazar and kept incommunicado until the next day, without any food or medical treatment. Bruised and with his arm in a sling, he was produced before a magistrate the following afternoon. p. 240, [54] Lala Lajpat Rai died from injuries he incurred during one such lathi charge. During a strange illness in February-March, 1939 that debilitated him during a crucial juncture of his political career, S. Bose seriously considered a suggestion that he was being poisoned. He considered the suggestion important enough to document it: "A few days after I fell ill, I began to receive letters or telegrams from different places suggesting the nature of my malady. Among them were some telegrams suggesting that I had been poisoned. My doctors were amused at first. Then they gave thought to the matter and could not find any clinical data to support this theory. So they put it aside." p. 104, [66]. Medical diagnostic techniques in India in 1939 were not advanced enough to detect sophisticated or rare poisons. Any event the pathology of his illness which lasted for a month could not be determined either. M. Gandhi has never been subjected to physical violence by the British, his coterie only minimally (J. Nehru has recalledone incident where he received "two resounding blows [from a mounted policeman] on the back" p.135, [16] - it is unclear if he needed any medical attention subsequently). We would later see that the Gandhi-Irwin pact would distinguish between the non-violentand the rest of the political prisoners – an amnesty would only be extendedonly to the non-violent political prisoners, most of whom were Gandhians, enabling the Gandhi-Irwin pact to be easily ratified as most of the opponents were jailed.

Next, as we already mentioned, Gandhi's funding was never choked, but those of the revolutionaries' were. Since by Gandhi's own admission, most of his funding came from wealthy industrialists, it would have been relatively easy to attrition this funding by putting under search light the financial irregularities of the sponsors. British government introduced several repressive acts for specifically controlling the revolutionaries, eg, the Defence of India Act during war time which empowered the Government to do anything with regard to any person and his property merely on suspicion that such a person may act in a way which might undermine public safety p. 188,[55], the Rowlatt Act which gave the government emergency powers during peace time – the right to arrest, search and imprison any person withouttrial or trial in special courts as necessary p. 188, [94]. So they could surely have brought in acts that mandated penalty to any organization(eg, Congress) that demanded secession from theBritish empire which would drastically reduce his funding – but they did not.This is explicable given that 1) many high ranking British officials including Viceroys Chelmsford, Linlithgow and Puckle (Director general of Intelligence in1940) regarded Gandhi as an "asset" p. 94, Vol. 3, p. 138, Vol. 4, [99] andan ally p. 179, [100], and 2) Ellen Wilkinson, who was a member of the BritishParliament for several years and became a member of the British cabinet from1945-1947, remarked after her visit to India in 1932 as a member of the India League Deputation that "Gandhi was the best policeman the British had in India"p. 219, [4].

British definitely invested well in Gandhi as hehelped to nip in the bud genuine freedom movements that were emerging in his regime, and subverted the ones he had to announce under tremendous public pressure. He remained loyal to the British throughout his life, except for a brief period around 1942, when given how the Axis powers were advancing at lightning speed, he assumed that British would lose the second world war. This judgment in error led to his marginalization, while power was indeed transferred to a PM who remained loyal to the British throughout the second world war (multiple accounts including those of M. Azad narrate that J. Nehru resisted the announcement of the Quit India movement as long as he could; the marginalization is indicated in Gandhi's quote from pp. 394, [88] cited towards the end of the first paragraph of this section). That British indeed transferred power to a friendly regime would be evident from the following. Mountbatten wanted the Congress and League leaders to have the Union Jack on the upper canton of their flags. Gandhi, Nehru and Patel were amenable. Gandhi sharply criticized those who opposed. He said: "I have been asked some questions. Here is one: 'One understands that the national flag that has been proposed will have a little Union Jack in a corner. It that is so, we shall tear up such a flag and, if need be, sacrifice our lives.'. His answer was 'But what is wrong with having the Union Jack in a corner of our flag? If harm has been done to usby the British it has not been done by their flag and we must also take note of the virtues of the British. They are voluntarily withdrawing from India, leaving power in our hands. A drastic bill which virtually liquidates the Empire did not take even a week to pass in Parliament. Time was when even very unimportant bills took a year and more to be passed. Whether they have been honest inframing the bill only experience will show. We are having Lord Mountbatten a sour chief gate-keeper. So long he has been the servant of the British king. Now he is to be our servant. If while we employed him as our servant we also had the Union Jack in a corner of our flag, there would be no betrayal of India in this. This is my opinion. But I understand that the report is not true. It pains me that the Congress leaders could not show this generosity. We would have thereby shown our friendship for the British. If I had the power that I once had I would have taken the people to task for it. After all, why should we give up our humanity." pp. 86-87, [93]. The plan did not materialize owing to "the general feeling among Congress extremists.....that Indian leaders were pandering far too much to the British. "Both Nehru and Jinnah wanted to fly the Union Jack twelve days a year, but did not want their intention to be publicized. This desire was aborted fearing adverse public reaction as well pp. 164, 230-231, 596 [83] pp. 383-384, [55].

Money power, divisive politics, foreign influenceand the personality cult of M. Gandhi will play a substantial role in the Gandhi-Bose interactions, which we will examine in subsequent pieces.


[1] – R. C. Majumdar, "History & Culture of the Indian People'', Vol. 11


[3] Margaret Halbeck and Gita Piramal, India's industralists, Vol. 1,

[4] – S. C. Bose, TheIndian Struggle (1920-1942)

[5] – P. N. Chopra and Prabha Chopra, "CollectedWorks of Sardar Patel'', Vol. 8, pp. 24

[6] – Ravindra Kumar, "Selected Works of NetajiSubhas Chandra Bose: 1936-1946', Vol. 3, pp.162, 166

[7] – ibid, Gandhi's Statement to the Press,Shimla, 05/09/1939,

[8] Bande Mataram 1, 2,

[9] -

[10] – M.K. Gandhi, "I Rejoice in this Defeat'',Harijan, 02/02/1939.

[11] – Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,Independence, Article in Young India, 13/01/1927


[13] Subhas Bose, An Address to Students of India,Presidential Address at the All India Students' Conference, Delhi, in January,1940, Included in Crossroads, being the works of Subhas Chandra Bose,1938-1940, Compiled by Netaji Research Bureau, Asia Publishing House, 1962, pp.241-247

[14] Hugh Toye Subhas Chandra Bose – The Springing Tiger, Jaico Publishing House, 2013

[15] -

[16] J. Nehru, Toward Freedom – The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru, The John Day Company, New York,1941

[17] Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Speech at the Federal Structure Committee, London, 15/09/1931,

[18] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to Lord Linlithgow,04/04/1938,

[19] Ramesh Chandra Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement, Volume III


[21] - "Collectedworks of Mahatma Gandhi'', Statement to the Press, Simla, 05/09/1939. 312

[22] – ibid, Letterto Reginald Maxwell, 02/12/1940, 409-410

[23] – ibid, Gandhi speech at Sevagram,> p189

[24] – ibid, Gandhi Letter to Lord Linlithgow,25/05/1940

[25] – ibid, Conversations with Members of theRashtriya Yuvak Sangh,

[26] – ibid Gandhi Letter to Lord Linlithgow,14/08/1942 211

[27] – ibid, Gandhi, To Every Briton, 02/07/1940 387

[28] – ibid, Gandhi, Draft Resolution for AICC,24/04/1942 231

[29] – ibid, Gandhi Interview to press 14/07/1942

[30] – ibid, Gandhi interview to Associated Press,06/08/1942,

[31] – ibid, When? Article in Harijan, 09/03/1940, p.25

[32] – ibid, Interview to the Press, Bombay,16/05/1942,

[33] – Sankar Ghose, "Mahatma Gandhi'', pp.279-280.

[34] – Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 'DelhiResolution' pp.414-415

[35] – Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 'A Cryin the Wilderness'

[36] – ibid, 'Both Happy and Unhappy',

[37] – ibid, 'One more faction?' 434

[38] – Government of India White Paper on CongressParty's Responsibility for the events of 1942, 13/02/1943

[39] - Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Telegramto Jawaharlal Nehru, 21/12/1938 335

[40] – ibid, Telegram to Sardar Patel, 21/12/1938, 337

[41] – Statement issued to the Press by Jawaharlal Nehru, 22/02/1939, Dr. Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence & Select Documents,Vol.3, pp.292-294,+but+directly+from+the+top,+with+the%22&source=bl&ots=IT3OM6LZlj&sig=YsMzSsBS8UNXcSSzeLJ4XF026Hs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YMZQVeeVEI2cyASqoYCwDw&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22There%20is%20a%20tendency%20also%20for%20local%20Congress%20disputes%20to%20be%20dealt%20with%20not%20in%20the%20usual%20routine%20way%2C%20but%20directly%20from%20the%20top%2C%20with%20the%22&f=false

[42] – Bose, Signed editorial in the Forward Bloc,19/08/1939, Referred in Crossroads p. 18

[43] – Bose, Signed editorial in the Forward Bloc,04/11/1939

[44] - Forward Bloc - Its Justification, TheIndian Struggle 1920-42, p. 409, pp. 396-397

[45] – Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 'India Wins Freedom'

[46] Complete works of Mahatma Gandhi, Speech onResolution on Nehru Report, Calcutta Congress III, 31/12/1928,




[50] Nanda Mookherjee: Subhas Chandra Bose: TheBritish Press, Intelligence and Parliament, Jayasree Prakashan, Calcutta700026, 1981

[51] J Nehru "AnAutobiography", Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1941

[52] B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, TheHistory of the Indian National Congress, Vol. II, Bombay, 1946

[53] JB Kripalani ,Gandhi His Life and Thought

[54] Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj – Biography of Indian Nationalists, Saratand Subhas Chandra Bose

[55] Suniti Ghosh TheTragic Partition of Bengal

[56] Jayakar The Story ofmy Life II, Bombay, 1959

[57] G D Birla In theShadow of the Mahatma

[58] J Nehru TheDiscovery of India

[59] D D Kosambi Exasperating Essays, Pune

[60] V J Patel and Subhas Chandra Bose The BosePatel Manifesto, Vienna, 9, May 1933, The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942, p. 357

[61] Subhas Bose The Struggle and After, ThePresidential speech of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose at the third Indian PoliticalConference held in London on June 10, 1933, The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942, pp.358-379

[62] Rajmohan Gandhi Patel – A Life

[63] K F Nariman "Whither Congress: SpiritualIdealism or Political Realism" Some Random thoughts on the Poona Conferenceand After, November, 1933

[64] N. Mansergh (editor-in-chief) Constitutionalrelations Between British and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47, in 12volumes, London 1971-1983 Vol VIII

[65] Medha M. Kudayisya "TheLife and Times of G D Birla"

[66] Subhas Chandra Bose, Congress President,Speeches, Articles and Letters, January 1938-May 1939, Bose Collected Works,Vol. 9

[67] -

[68] C. Markovits, "Indian Business andNationalist Politics''

[69] B. R. Nanda, "TheNehrus: Motilal and Jawaharlal, London, 1962

[70] Sir William Wedderburn, Allan Octavian Hume,Father of the Indian National congress, 1913

[71] A O Hume on the Aims and Objects of theCongress, 30 April, 1888, in C. H. Philips (ed.), the Evolution of India andPakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents. London, 1962

[72] Suniti Kumar Ghosh "The Indian BigBourgeoisie – Its genesis, Growth and Character"

[73] Dutt, Rajani Palme, India Today, Bombay, 1947



[76] – Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Bhagat Singh's Condolence speech,

[77] – ibid, Gandhi's farewell reception in London, on 14/12/1914

[78] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to JL Maffey, Secretary to the Viceroy, 30/04/1918

[79] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to Jinnah, 09/07/1918

[80] – ibid, Gandhi's appeal in a speech in Nadiad,22/06/1918.

[81] – ibid, Gandhi's second appeal in an enlistmentposter, 22/07/1918,

[82] – ibid, Interview to Louis Fischer, 04/06/1942

[83] N. Mansergh (editor-in-chief) Constitutionalrelations Between British and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47, in 12volumes, London 1971-1983 Vol X12

[84] Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Letter toSatis Chandra Das Gupta, 24/08/1929

[85] – ibid, Gandhi's speech at the LahoreCongress Session II, 31/12/1929,

[86] – ibid, Interview with the Viceroy: Gandhi'sreport 18/02/1931

[87] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to Sardar Patel,01/11/1937

[88] – ibid, Gandhi's speech at a Prayer Meeting,25/11/1947,

[89] – ibid, Gandhi's speech at Chharwada,26/04/1930,

[90] – ibid, Gandhi's speech at a Prayer meeting,28/05/1947,

[91] – ibid, Telegram in answer to Shyam SunderChakravarti, 16/12/1921,

[92] – ibid, Interview to Louis Fischer, 04/06/1942

[93] – ibid, Speech at a Prayer Meeting, New Delhi,19/07/1947,

[94] Suniti Kumar Ghosh, India and the Raj1919-1947 - Glory, Shame and Bondage, Volume 1

[95] Ashok Kumar Majumdar, Advent of Independence

[96] Munshi, Pilgrimage

[97] Madhusree Mukherjee Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of Indiaduring World War II

[98] D. G. Tendulkar, Life of MohandasKaramchand Gandhi, Vol I, New Delhi, 1969, Vols II-VIII, Bombay, 1951-1954

[99] G D Birla "Bapu – A unique association"

[100] Judith M. Brown "Gandhi's rise to power –Indian Politics 1915-1922"

[101] – Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,Gandhi's letter to Dr. BC Roy, 07/12/1932,

[102] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to Natarajan,25/02/1918,

[103] – ibid, Gandhi's interview to SardarSahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan, 20/01/1920,

[104] – Gandhi's Interview with Bengal Delegates,29/12/1921,

[105] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to GD Birla,08/05/1929

[106] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to GD Birla,26/08/1929

[107] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to GD Birla,18/09/1929,

[108] – ibid, Gandhi's speech on Capital andLabour and Rowlatt Bills, Nagapattanam, 29/03/1919

[109] – ibid, Gandhi's letter to Lord Linlithgow,07/06/1940,

[110] – ibid, Satyagraha in South Africa,Translated to English by V. Desai, 28/04/1928,

[111] – ibid, Discussion with John. R.Mott, 04/12/1938,

Saswati Sarkar is a professor at the department of electrical and systems engineering at the University of Pennsylvania. The views expressed here are in her personal capacity.